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NOTES
OCCUPATIONAL NOISE: A WATERSHED ISSUE FOR OSHA
BRIAN NORDWALL*
OSHA has maintained that industry must utilize engineer-
ing controls wherever feasible to meet the agency's occupational
noise level standards. OSHA's very broad interpretation of
"feasibility" has met resistance from the courts and from the
agency's own review commission, which have tended to apply a
cost-benefit approach. In part as a result of this resistance, the
attack on OSHA's noise regulation scheme has been broadened
to encompass the agency's requirement that engineering controls
be given priority in abating occupational noise. The author pres-
ents the arguments on both sides of these issues, and concludes
that OSHA 's construction of feasibility is erroneous. The author
also finds that the agency's position on engineering control priori-
ties is particularly vulnerable on the noise regulation question,
and could endanger OSHA's entire regulatory scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Speaking before a House subcommittee, Congressman William
A. Steiger, co-author of the Occupational Safety and Health Act,'
stated that the controversy over the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration's (OSHA) workplace noise standard could
be responsible for "making or breaking" the act.2 The Congressman
elaborated, stating that while he believed OSHA could formulate a
workable standard, "this very complex standard must . . . be han-
dled with great prudence by the Department of Labor and if done
well can assure a stronger agency. If not done responsibly it can
assure the destruction of the whole effort."' Apparently, OSHA con-
curs with Congressman Steiger's appraisal of the importance of the
occupational noise standard, identifying it as the "watershed issue
for the Agency," 4 one that has "engendered major controversy. '
* Articles and Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (Supp. 11976).
2. 74 NOISE REG. REP. (BNA) A-10 (March 14, 1977) (summary of Congressman Steiger's
remarks before the House, Education and Labor Subcommittee on Compensation, Safety and
Health, March 1, 1977).
3. Id. at A-11. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration is a subdivision of
the Department of Labor.
4. 70 NoIsE REG. REP. (BNA) A-13 (Jan. 17, 1977) (text of transition paper prepared by
OSHA for incoming Carter Administration).
5. Id.
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Paragraph (b)(1) of the current OSHA occupational noise stan-
dard, 29 C.F.R. section 1910.95 states:
[wihen employees are subjected to sound exceeding those listed
in Table G-16, feasible administrative or engineering controls
shall be utilized. If such controls fail to reduce sound levels within
the levels of Table G-16, personal protective equipment shall be
provided and used to reduce sound levels within the levels of the
table.'
The controversy over section 1910.95 has been joined largely over
two rather closely intertwined issues, both of which are raised by the
language employed in paragraph (b)(1) of section 1910.95. The first
issue concerns the meaning of the word "feasible," the definition of
which has been contested primarily in the courts and before the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. The second
issue concerns the priority afforded to "administrative and engi-
neering controls." The present occupational noise regulation per-
mits the use of personal protective equipment, only where adminis-
trative and engineering controls are not sufficient or feasible. The
debate over these priorities has in large measure been conducted in
hearings and comment periods on OSHA's proposed new occupa-
6. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95(b)(1) (1976). Table G-16 lists the permissible exposures as a
function of time and noise level:





3 ..................................... .............. .97
2 ........................................................1 00.. ........l
1 1/2 ...............................................................1 0 2
1 ...................................................................1 0 5
1 /2 ............................................. .............. . ...1 1 0
1/4 o r less ... ... .. .. .... .. .... ... ... ... .... .. ..... ... .... .. .. ... ..1 15
The present section 1910.95 noise exposure standard was first promulgated in 1969 (41 C.F.R.
50-204) under the authority of the Walsh-Healey Public Contract Act, 41 U.S.C. § 35 (1970).
Under the Walsh-Healey Act, the regulation was applicable only to those firms having supply
contracts with the government in excess of $10,000. On May 29, 1971, the standard was
established under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, specifically under section 655(a)
of title 29 of the United States Code, which permits the Secretary of Labor to promulgate
through OSHA any established federal standard. According to OSHA guidelines, [Reference
File] NOISE REG. REP. (BNA) 41:3003, 04, engineering controls include: substitution of manu-
facturing processes, substitution of machinery, vibration dampening, reducing sound trans-
mission through solid objects, various sound muffling devices, baffles, completely enclosing
individual machines and insulating rooms. Administrative controls include performing high
noise operations at night or between shifts, rearranging work schedules, rotating employees
and operating machines for less than a full business day.
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tional noise standard, which was first introduced in October, 1974.1
As will be shown, the controversy over section 1910.95(b)(1) is
a microcosm of the controversy over the Occupational Safety and
Health Act itself. Accordingly it brings to light many competing
policy considerations, and challenges many of the assumptions
which have affected judicial and administrative interpretation and
rulemaking under the Act.
II. THE CONSTRUCTION OF.'FEASIBLE"
The conflict over the meaning of "feasible", as it appears in
section 1910.95(b)(1), has centered on the question of whether eco-
nomic,8 as well as technical' feasibility is denoted. OSHA contends"0
that "feasible" means anything that is technically feasible or possi-
ble:
[tihe Department of Labor considers 'feasible' to mean the fol-
lowing, as stated in the Oxford-English and Merriam Webster
dictionaries: 'capable of being done, accomplished or carried out;
capable of being dealt with successfully."'
The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission disagrees
with this position. In a 2-1 decision, the Commission in Continental
Can Co. 12 held: "as used in the Act, 'feasibility' contemplates eco-
nomic as well as technological feasibility."'" In reaching its conclu-
sion, the Commission relied on Industrial Union Department, AFL-
CIO v. Hodgson," and AFL-CIO v. Brennan.5 Both of these cases
construed "feasible", as it appears in section 655(b)(5) of the Act"
7. 39 Fed. Reg. 37,773 (1974).
8. See AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975); Industrial Union Dept., AFL-
CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Continental Can Co., 4 0cc. Saf. & Health
Cas. 1541 (OSHRC 1976).
9. Id.
10. Continental Can Co., 4 Occ. Saf. & Health Cas. 1541, 1546 (OSHRC 1976).
11. [Reference File] NOISE REG. REP. (BNA) 41:3003.
12. Continental Can Co., 4 0cc. Saf. & Health Cas. 1541, 1546 (OSHRC 1976). OSHA
petitioned the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for review of this decision. See 64 NOISE REG.
REP. (BNA) A-15 (Oct. 25, 1976). On April 26, 1977, OSHA withdrew its petition. However,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted the Commission's approach in Continental
Can. In Turner Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 561 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1977), the court, citing
Continental Can, held that section 1910.95(b)(1) contemplated economic, as well as technical
feasibility. In so doing the court reversed a decision handed down by the Commission the
same day as Continental Can. Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Commission had found Turner
factually distinguishable from Continental Can. Thus the Commission's espousal of an eco-
nomic feasibility standard has yet to be specifically affirmed by an appeals court.
13. Continental Can Co., 4 Occ. Saf. & Health Cas. 1541, 1546 (OSHRC 1976).
14. 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
15. 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (Supp. 11971) states:
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to require the consideration of economic consequences in determin-
ing feasibility. In his dissent in Continental Can'7 Commissioner
Cleary argues that the statutory language relied on appears to be
restricted to the promulgation of new standards, whereas the occu-
pational noise standard was introduced under section 655(a) which
provides for promulgation of previously existing Federal Stan-
dards."8 This position ignores a number of crucial factors. It disre-
gards that explicit in the AFL-CIO and Industrial Union courts'
construction of "feasible" was an interpretation of Congressional
intent as to the scope and function of the Act itself:
[t]here can be no question that OSHA represents a decision to
require safeguards for the health of employees even if such mea-
sures substantially increase production costs. This is not, how-
ever, the same thing as saying that Congress intended to require
immediate implementation of all protective measures technologi-
cally achievable without regard for their economic impact. To the
contrary, it would comport with common usage to say that a
standard that is prohibitively expensive is not 'feasible."9
As both courts also point out, an expansive interpretation of the
application of "feasible" is mandated by the expressly evidenced
intent of Congress, as vocalized by Senator Javits, whose amend-
ment inserted the "feasible" language into the Act:
[a]s a result of this amendment the Secretary, in setting stan-
dards, is expressly required to consider the feasibility of proposed
standards. This is an improvement over the Daniels bill, which
might be interpreted to require absolute health and safety in all
cases, regardless of feasibility, and the Administration bill, which
contains no criteria for standards at all."
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or
harmful physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most
adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available
evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional
capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by
such standard for the period of his working life. Development of standards under
this subsection shall be based upon research, demonstrations, experiments, and
such other information as may be appropriate. In addition to the attainment of
the highest degree of health and safety protection for the employee, other consid-
erations shall be the latest available scientific data in the field, the feasibility of
the standards, and experience gained under this and other health and safety laws.
Whenever practicable, the standard promulgated shall be expressed in terms of
objective criteria and of the performance desired. (emphasis added).
17. 4 0cc. Saf. & Health Cas. 1541, 1551 (OSHRC 1976).
18. See note 6 supra.
19. AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 1975) (citing Industrial Union Dept.,
AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
20. S. Rep. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1970).
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Given that both the courts and the Congress have enunciated a
broad policy consideration for requiring that standards be
"feasible," logic dictates that what is "feasible" within the meaning
of section 655(b)(5) of the Act is also what is "feasible" under sec-
tion 1910.95(b)(1) of the regulations. To argue that "feasible"
means something radically different in a regulation, merely because
the regulation is promulgated under a section of the Act where
"feasible" does not appear, seems absurd. It would be more consis-
tent to argue that no.feasibility, rather than a different standard of
feasibility, be required. Both arguments should fail since the inher-
ent importance of the concept of feasibility to the Act renders it
highly unlikely that Congress intended that already existing federal
standards re-promulgated under section 655(a) be less "feasible"
than new standards promulgated under section 655(b).
Commissioner Cleary also argues that the Act should be con-
strued as a "technology forcing" piece of legislation:
[Iln the area of safety, we wish to emphasize that the Secretary
is not restricted by the status quo. He may raise standards which
require improvements in existing technologies or which require
the development of new technology, and he is not limited to
issuing standards based solely on devices fully developed."1
The rationale behind this technology forcing policy is that one goal
of the Act is the permanent improvement of working environments
and that standards which necessitate technological improvement
are an effective means to this end." Commissioner Cleary maintains
that since the purpose of the Act is to provide permanent improve-
ment in working conditions, economic factors should only be consid-
ered in determining the time period within which compliance will
be required."3 Although the Commissioner argues that requiring eco-
nomic as well as technical feasibility completely "emasculates" the
technology forcing policy of the Act,24 it is unlikely that the concept
of economic feasibility would be carried that far. Indeed, the major-
ity in Continental Can stated: "controls may be economically feasi-
ble even though they are expensive and increase production costs. " 25
The court in Industrial Union Department v. Hodgson went even
21. Continental Can Co., 4 0cc. Saf. & Health Cas. 1541, 1550 (OSHRC 1976) (citing
Society of Plastic Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir. 1975)).
22. See 56 NOISE REO. REP. A-3 (July 5, 1976) (summary of remarks of Assistant Labor
Secretary Morton Corn before Inter-Industry Noise Study Steering Committee, June 22,
1976).
23. Continental Can. Co., 4 Occ. Saf. & Health Cas. 1541, 1550 (OSHRC 1976).
24. Id. at 1549-50.
25. Id. at 1547. See also Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc. v. OSHA, 529 F.2d 649, 653
(8th Cir. 1976).
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further, stating that standards might be economically feasible even
though they are financially burdensome, and even though they
might force out of business laggard employers who have fallen be-
hind the rest of the industry in meeting standards."
In Society of Plastics Industries v. OSHA,27 a case heavily relied
upon by Commissioner Cleary in his argument against economic
feasibility, the OSHA standard concerned exposure to vinyl chlor-
ide, a known carcinogen. The employer was required to utilize all
feasible engineering controls and, in addition, to supply personal
protective equipment entailing the distribution of respiratory de-
vices to all employees exposed to even a slight concentration (one
part per million) of vinyl chloride. While the majority in
Continental Can did not compare the costs and benefits of providing
respiratory equipment to all employees exposed to greater than one
part per million vinyl chloride, versus that of providing ear plugs to
those employees of Continental Can exposed to noise in excess of
Table G-1628 limits, the court did distinguish the type of hazard
posed:
[t]hus the hazard is not life threatening in this case and al-
though it will produce serious loss of hearing in some cases we
must consider the fact that the harm in other cases will be little
if any hearing loss. The situation, therefore, is distinguishable
from life threatening hazards such as those posed by carcinogenic
substances."
The court went on to expound a balancing of costs and benefits: "in
our view resources should be allocated on a priority basis to obtain
the benefits that may be achieved by eliminating life threatening
hazards first and lesser hazards second. And by saying 'second' we
do not mean second in time but rather second in priority for alloca-
tion of resources.' ' 30 This cost-benefit balancing test was sharply
criticized by Commissioner Cleary: "[wihile this approach seems
logical, I submit that a better deaf-than-dead concept is too Dra-
conian to be consistent with the statutory purpose of providing a
safe and healthful workplace." '31
This conflict over application of a cost-benefit analysis to
OSHA standards appears to lie at the very heart of the occupational
noise controversy. This is evidenced both in the feasibility question
26. 499 F.2d at 478 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
27. 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975).
28. See note 6 supra.
29. Continental Can Co., 4 0cc. Saf. & Health Cas. 1541, 1547 (OSHRC 1976).
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 1552.
[Vol. 32:667
NOTES
discussed above, and in the debate over the proposed new occupa-
tional noise regulation, to be discussed below. Those who agree with
Commissioner Cleary would argue that the function of OSHA is to
force technology to permanently improve the workplace environ-
ment, that no price can be put on safety and health, and that
economic criteria may only be utilized to determine enforcement
timetables. Those who agree with the majority in Continental Can
would argue that employers have finite resources which necessitate
the'iaking of hard choices, and thus the imposition of a cost-benefit
analysis. Moreover, it might be observed that the "technical feasi-
bility only" position implies a cost-benefit analysis which concludes
that the costs of technically feasible protection are always out-
weighed by the benefits. It also assumes that given unlimited re-
sources, the horizons of "technical" feasibility would expand infi-
nitely.
To date, the courts have not found it necessary to deny the
separability of technical feasibility from economic feasibility. In-
stead, they have been content to hold merely that the concept of
feasibility includes economic considerations. In so doing, the
Continental Can court seemed to imply that a cost-benefit analysis
should be employed to determine economic feasibility32 Under the
present occupational noise standard, however, once it has been de-
termined that engineering or administrative controls are economi-
cally and technically feasible, then, although they may be more
expensive, they must be implemented in lieu of personal protection
controls. Section 1910.95 quite clearly sets this priority, and a cost-
benefit analysis may not be further applied to determine whether
personal protection controls might be used instead. On the other
hand, a showing that the cost of technically feasible engineering
controls greatly exceeds the cost of personal hearing protection may
result, in some instances, in a finding of economic infeasibility. 3
Strong arguments have been made in the debate over the proposed
new regulation that personal protection controls not automatically
be disallowed wherever engineering or administrative controls are
feasible, but rather, that the cost-benefit analysis be extended to
determine at the outset which approach should be utilized.
III. THE PROPOSED NEW OCCUPATIONAL NOISE REGULATION
On October 24, 1974, prior to the Continental Can decision,
OSHA proposed a new occupational noise exposure regulation 34 to
32. See id.
33. Id. at.1548.
34. 39 Fed. Reg. 37,773 (1974).
19781
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
replace the present section 1910.95. The proposal has been the sub-
ject of numerous hearings and comments since that date, and re-
mains an unresolved and controversial issue. Perhaps because the
adverse ruling on economic feasibility in Continental Can was not
anticipated, the proposed regulation does not attempt to reflect
OSHA's present position on feasibility by specifically limiting the
term to technical feasibility. Instead, it retains the broader language
of the present regulation. 5 Thus, rather than settling the feasibility
controversy, Continental Can has served to fuel the debate over
economic feasibility. It has encouraged certain industrial interests
to propose that the engineering and administrative control priorities
appearing in both the present and proposed36 regulation be scrapped
in favor of a straight cost-benefit approach, while motivating em-
ployee groups and other interests to suggest that the effect of
Continental Can be limited or eliminated altogether.
It should be noted that in addition to requiring economic feasi-
bility, Continental Can places the burden of proving feasibility
upon OSHA.37 In a policy paper prepared for the incoming Carter
administration, OSHA indicated that it is considering modifying
the proposed regulation to shift this burden back to the employer. 5
This would reduce considerably the impact of Continental Can. It
is possible that OSHA may consider going even further and essen-
tially overrule Continental Can by defining "feasible" to preclude
economic considerations. Such a hard line policy is suggested by the
wording of the OSHA policy paper referred to above,3 and by the
remarks of at least one administration official.4"
However, given the language of AFL-CIO v. Brennan, and
Industrial Union Department v. Hodgson, which construe economic
feasibility to be an underlying policy consideration of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act itself, it would seem that any attempt
by OSHA to eliminate economic feasibility criteria by regulation
would be successfully challenged in the courts. Furthermore, due to
the very substantial policy pressures that have been generated to
extend the cost-benefit rationale of Continental Can to replace the
priority presently accorded to engineering and administrative con-
trols, OSHA may find it imprudent to attempt the complete elimi-
35. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95(b)(1) (1976).
36. Id.
37. Continental Can Co., 4 0cc. Saf. & Health Cas. at 1548. See also Love Box Co., 4
Occ. Saf. & Health Cas. *1138 (OSHRC 1976).
38. 70 NOISE REG. REP. (BNA) A-13 (Jan. 17, 1977) (text of OSHA policy paper).
39. Id. at A-13.
40. 65 NOISE REG. REP. (BNA) A-3 (Oct. 8, 1976) (summary of remarks of Charles I.
Elkins, EPA Deputy Assistant Administrator).
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nation of economic feasibility criteria.
Throughout the hearings and comments on OSHA's proposed
new occupational noise regulation, a considerable number of groups
and agencies have supported revisions which would permit the em-
ployer to choose between engineering and administrative controls or
providing personal hearing protection for employees, especially with
regard to presently existing machinery and facilities. Industry is
virtually unanimous in support of this position.4' This is also the
view of the Council on Wage and Price Stability, which has stated
its belief that the present OSHA proposal is inflationary and that
the use of ear protection devices would accomplish the objectives of
the regulation at a significantly lower cost.4" The Small Business
Administration is of the view that the cost of engineering controls
may be beyond the reach of many small businesses, thus resulting
in the denial of market entry to small firms unable to do the re-
search and development necessary to comply.43 In addition, Con-
gressman William Steiger, co-author of the Act, has recommended
that OSHA consider "grandfathering" existing conditions." There
is no doubt that implementation of engineering controls on a nation-
wide basis would involve very substantial expense. A study commis-
sioned by OSHA has estimated that the cost of implementing the
present ninety decibel standard in all workplaces within the pur-
view of the Act would be $11.4 billion, and that engineering controls
to reduce noise to eighty-five decibels45 would cost $19.9 billion.4"
Other cost estimates have ranged from $8 to $30 billion.4" It is gener-
ally acknowledged that personal protective controls, consisting es-
sentially of ear plugs and ear muffs, are far less expensive. In
Continental Can the court found that the cost of Continental Can's
41. See, e.g., 65 NOISE REG. REP. (BNA) A-4 (Nov. 8, 1976) (summary of written com-
ments submitted to OSHA by steel industry firms); 64 NoIsE REG. REP. (BNA) A-3 (Oct. 25,
1976) (summary of remarks of Terence A. Dear, senior noise consultant, E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., before OSHA hearings); 60 NOISE REG. REP. (BNA) A-2 (Aug. 30, 1976)
(summary of comments directed to OSHA by various industrial groups).
42. 62 NoisE REG. REP. (BNA) AA-4 (Sept. 27, 1974) (summary of written testimony
submitted to OSHA by Council on Wage and Price Stability).
43. 64 NoisE REG. REP. (BNA) A-11 (Oct. 25, 1976) (summary of a study commissioned
by the Small Business Administration).
44. 74 NOISE REG. REP. (BNA) A-10 (March 14, 1977) (summary of Congressman
Steiger's remarks before the House, Education and Labor Sub-Committee on Compensation,
Safety and Health, March 1, 1977).
45. OSHA has also considered lowering the 90 dBA threshold to 85 dBA. See 70 NOIsE
REG. REP. (BNA) A-12 (Jan. 17, 1977).
46. Id. at A-15.
47. Id. at A-13. See also 63 NOISE REG. REP. (BNA) AA-5 (Oct. 11, 1976) (summary of
testimony by Nicholas A. Ashford, center for Policy Alternatives, MIT, before OSHA hear-
ings, Sept. 27, 1976).
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compliance through use of engineering controls would require a cap-
ital expenditure of approximately $33,230,000, with upkeep expen-
ses of $175,000 annually, while the total cost of implementing per-
sonal protection would be $100,000 annually." These starkly con-
trasting figures lend powerful support to the arguments of those
favoring a straight cost-benefit determination of occupational noise
abatement procedures.
Support for continued emphasis on engineering controls has
come from various labor groups, the Environmental Protection
Agency, and OSHA itself. 9 These entities have espoused the posi-
tion, as did Commissioner Cleary in his dissent in Continental Can,
that the purpose of the Act is to force new technological develop-
ments in order to provide a permanent improvement in workplace
safety,5 and that this justifies requiring engineering controls al-
though they may be far more expensive than personal protective
controls. Their feeling is that if engineering controls are not required
wherever feasible, there will be no incentive to develop noise sup-
pression technology which could be utilized more economically as
new plants are built.5 ' Closely related is the argument that the Act
places primary responsibility for maintaining a safe workplace upon
the employer," and that permitting the use of personal protective
equipment shifts the burden to the employee.53 In support of this
position, it has been argued that personal hearing protective devices
are uncomfortable, that they make communication difficult, that
they do not always fit properly so as to provide the necessary protec-
tion, and that, as a result, workers may not always wear them, or if
they do, they may not be receiving sufficient protection. 4
48. Continental Can Co., 4 0cc. Saf. & Health Cas. 1541, 1548 (OSHRC 1976).
49. See, e.g., 65 NOISE REG. REP. (BNA) A-3 (Nov. 8, 1976) (summary of remarks of
Charles I. Elkins, EPA Deputy Assistant Administrator); 63 NOISE REG. REP. (BNA) AA-5
(Oct. 11, 1976) (summary of statements by United Paperworkers International Union, United
Autoworkers and the AFL-CIO, protesting OSHA's holding of additional hearings on the
occupational noise question); 56 NoisE REG. REP. (BNA) A-3 (July 5, 1976) (summary of
remarks of Assistant Labor Secretary Morton Corn before Inter-Industry Noise Study Steer-
ing Committee, June 22, 1976).
50. Continental Can Co., 4 0cc. Saf. & Health Cas. 1541 (OSHRC 1976).
51. 56 NOISE REG. REP. (BNA) A-3 (July 5, 1976) (summary of remarks of Assistant Labor
Secretary Morton Corn before Inter-Industry Noise Study Steering Committee, June 22,
1976).
52. See Anning-Johnson Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 516 F.2d
1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 1975).
53. 63 NOISE REG. REP. (BNA) AA-3, AA-5 (Oct. 11, 1976) (summary of written state-
ment submitted by EPA to Labor Department).
54. See 63 NOISE REC. REP. (BNA) AA-5 (Oct. 11, 1976) (summary of written statement




It is clear that, at least in the abstract, there are both sound
policy grounds and judicial support for each of the propositions
advanced in favor of maintaining the engineering control priority.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that when applied specifically to the
occupational noise controversy, these general considerations fail to
provide a reasonable basis for continuing the engineering controls
policy, at least as presently constituted. There is no doubt that one
function of the Occupational Safety and Health Act is to force tech-
nological advances to improve workplace safety. This would seem
to be a necessary and laudable purpose of the Act, which states in
part:
The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy. . . to
assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the
Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our
human resources-
by encouraging employers and employees in their efforts
to reduce the number of occupational safety and health hazards
.. . by building upon advances already made through em-
ployer and employee iniative for providing safe and healthful
working conditions;
.. . by developing innovative methods, techniques, and
approaches for dealing with occupational safety and health prob-
lems . . ..
The courts have interpreted this language to mandate technological
improvement in certain circumstances: "at least to a limited extent,
OSHA is to be viewed as a technology forcing piece of legislation." ' ,
It remains uncertain, however, whether the policy in question could
be considered an "innovative method, technique [or] approach"
under the Act.57 Further, this technology forcing goal could be ac-
complished far less expensively by requiring engineering controls
wherever feasible in the construction and installation of new plants
and machinery. A number of industries highly critical of the present
OSHA approach have proposed such a solution.58
55. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (Supp. 11971).
56. AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 120 (3d Cir. 1975). See also Society of Plastics
Indus. Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(5) (Supp. 11971).
58. 64 NOISE REG. REP. (BNA) A-3 to A-5 (Oct. 25, 1976) (summary of testimony submit-
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The social utility and policy considerations inherent in placing
the primary burden of making the workplace safe on the employer,
rather than the employee, is also clear. To hold otherwise would
tend to encourage the continuation of dangerous conditions by em-
ployers since they could argue that "employees should be more care-
ful." Also, as at least one court has pointed out, employers have
primary control over the workplace environment and should be re-
sponsible on this basis. 9 Further, in American Smelting and Refin-
ing Co. v. OSHA, 0 the court held that the employer could not rely
on respirators furnished to protect employees from airborne lead
where it was reasonably forseeable that the respirators were awk-
ward and uncomfortable, and would not be properly worn. It should
be noted however, that in American Smelting the personal protec-
tive equipment (respirators) was so uncomfortable and awkward
that, when an unannounced inspection was made, only one em-
ployee in the plant was found to be properly wearing a respirator."
In Continental Can the court found evidence that with a properly
administered and supervised program, personal ear protectors can
provide effective protection to most employees. In addition, in
American Smelting there was no comparison between engineering
and personal protection costs, a comparison which has been made
with reference to noise abatement and which reveals rather dra-
matic contrasts. Finally, while the hazard contemplated by the oc-
cupational noise standard is some degree of hearing loss, the hazard
involved in American Smelting was airborne lead, a poisonous and
potentially lethal agent. This last distinction calls for the balancing
test which the majority in Continental Can applied in determining
the benefit side of the cost-benefit equation. While Commissioner
Cleary in his dissent derisively termed this a "better deaf-than-
dead" approach, it is submitted that this is a reasonable and nec-
essary approach to governmental regulation in a resource-finite so-
ciety. It is further submitted that the noise regulation question pres-
ents an unusually compelling set of circumstances which virtually
mandate such an approach, and for precisely this reason, presents
a "watershed issue""3 for OSHA, and a powerful challenge to the
ted before OSHA hearings by E.l. duPont de Nemours & Co., American Metal Stamping
Ass'n, American Boiler Mfg. Ass'n, and the National Concrete Masonry Ass'n).
59. Anning-Johnson Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 516 F.2d
1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 1975). See also S. Rep. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1970); H.R.
Rep. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1970).
60. 501 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1974).
61. Id. at 515.
62. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
63. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
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engineering control priorities under which the agency has operated
to date.
The occupational noise debate involves a hazard which, viewed
coldly but realistically, is relatively minor. At the same time, the
cost of abatement of this hazard through engineering controls is
enormous, while personal protective controls are quite inexpensive.
Furthermore, while there are some problems with the comfort and
convenience of personal protective devices, and, in very limited situ-
ations, problems with their effectiveness," it would seem that with
proper supervision, a personal protection hearing program will pro-
vide very nearly all of the noise abatement benefits that engineering
controls would afford, and might in many instances reduce noise
exposure far below the levels proscribed by OSHA. Thus, the addi-
tional benefits provided by engineering controls are relatively small,
and, at least as to existing plants, pale in comparison to the addi-
tional costs involved. The very real technology-forcing benefits of
requiring engineering controls may be maintained by requiring such
controls, where feasible, for new plants and machinery. It is further
argued that the real long-term benefits to occupational safety and
health may not be well served by criteria which ignore cost-benefit
factors, since such criteria may eventually result in a hardpressed
society reducing the level of worker protection it chooses to afford."5
These extrinsic factors have already manifested themselves, per-
haps most concretely in criticism of the entire OSHA regulatory
scheme in Congress, where a number of bills to repeal the Act alto-
gether are currently pending.8
In analyzing the noise regulation controversy, it cannot be
ignored that inflation and resource shortages have substantially
altered perceptions of the extent to which social engineering can
realistically be undertaken by society. Within the OSHA context,
these broad social, economic and political concerns have coalesced
around the noise regulation controversy, which, it is submitted,
presents a factual situation that virtually demands a reappraisal
and modification of the engineering control priority in OSHA's pres-
ent regulatory scheme.
64. Continental Can Co., 4 0cc. Saf. & Health Cas. 1541, 1545 (OSHRC 1976).
65. See 30 NOISE REG. REp. (BNA) AA-5, AA-6 (July 7, 1975) (summary of statement
submitted to OSHA by the Council on Wage and Price Stability).
66. E.g., H.R. 381, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.; H.R. 2041 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
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